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compensated by money alone. Secondly, the House of Lords has
emphasised that litigation should be prosecuted efficiently and has
indicated that counsel should be treated more strictly than hitherto
when they apply for amendments at trial. Finally, it would appear that
limitation points cannot be pleaded for the first time in the course of a
trial or, at any rate, not when the merits of the case have been fully
considered.
The first of these three points is merely a gloss on the existing
rule, but the second and third are entirely new. It will be interesting to
see whether the second point, involving fresh emphasis on efficiency,
gains momentum. A century or more's orthodoxy might then need
major reconsideration. As for the third, it is correct in a sense to say
that in both Atkinson and Kettleman, the real matter in dispute was
litigated, even though the defendant's amendment in the latter case
was disallowed. But this is true only if one accepts the distinction
drawn by Lord Griffiths between the merits of a case and limitation
points and his decision to admit late pleading of the latter much less
freely.
N. H. ANDREWS.
SALVAGE-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION-INLAND WATERS

THE decision of Mr. Justice Sheen in The Goring [1986] 2 W.L.R. 219,
which was the subject of a note by Mr. Yale on p. 14, ante, has been
reversed by a majority ruling of the Court of Appeal (the Master of the
Rolls dissenting), on the ground that the salvage took place in
non-tidal waters: The Times, 2 March 1987. Leave to appeal to the
House of Lords has been given. A further note will follow when a full
report of the decision on appeal is available.

WAIT-AND-SEE: THE NEW AMERICAN UNIFORM ACT ON PERPETUITIES

wait-and-see version of perpetuity reform has gained a new
champion in the United States. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-the body responsible for
promulgating uniform legislation, such as the Uniform Commercial
Code, for recommended enactment by the federal states-recently
approved a Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. Shortly
thereafter, the Uniform Act was endorsed by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association, the Board of Regents of the
American College of Probate Counsel, and the Board of Governors of
the American College of Real Estate Lawyers.
THE
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Case and Comment

Among a number of unique features of the Uniform Act,
the method used to delimit the waiting period deserves special
notice. The waiting period, as anyone familiar with the wait-andsee reform movement knows, is the period of time allotted for the
contingencies attached to an otherwise invalid property interest
to work out harmlessly. In a step believed to be unprecedented,
the waiting period adopted by the Uniform Act is a flat period of
90 years.
The 90-year period represents a reasonable approximation of-a
proxy for-the period of time that would, on average, be produced by
the traditional method of identifying and tracing a set of actual
measuring lives and then tacking on a 21-year period following the
death of the survivor. The 90-year period was derived from the
assumption that the youngest measuring life, the one likely to live the
longest, would usually determine the length of the waiting period,
were actual measuring lives to be used. A statistical study prepared as
part of the Drafting Committee's work suggests that the youngest
measuring life, on average, would be about 6 years old. American
government statistics indicate that the remaining life expectancy of a
6-year old is between 69 and 70 years. In the interest of arriving at an
end number that is a multiple of five, the Committee utilized 69 years
as an appropriate measure of the remaining life expectancy of a 6-year
old, which-with the 21-year tack-on period added-yields a waiting
period of 90 years.
The traditional assumption, followed in previous wait-and-see
statutes, is that the waiting period must be deliminated by reference to
measuring lives, so that the waiting period expires 21 years after the
death of the last surviving measuring life. (The flat 80-year period in
section 1 of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964 and the flat
60-year period in California Civ. Code, s.715.6, are rules of initial
validity, not the waiting period for wait-and-see.) Rather than calling
into question the necessity or desirability of using measuring lives, the
controversy has centred on who they should be and how the law should
identify them. Two basic methods of identifying measuring lives have
been advanced: (i) the statutory-listmethod (used in the Perpetuties
and Accumulations Act 1964, s.3, a few other common-law
jurisdictions, and the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative
Transfers) s. 1.3 (1983)), and (ii) the causal-relationshipmethod (used
in Kentucky Rev. Stat., s.381.216 and the statutes of a few other
common-law jurisdictions).
Intrinsic to the actual-measuring-lives approach, however, are
identification and tracing problems. If the statutory-list method is used,
the measuring lives are difficult to describe in statutory language that is
both uncomplicated and unambiguous. The statutory language
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necessary to adopt the causal-relationship method is not so difficult to
draft as it is to apply to actual cases. No matter how the measuring lives
are identified, the lives of actual individuals must be traced so as to
determine which one is the survivor and when he or she died. The
tracing and identification problems are exacerbated by the fact that it
seems to be accepted under both methods that the measuring lives
cannot be a static group, assembled once and for always at the
beginning. Instead, individuals who were once measuring lives must be
dropped from the group on the happening of certain events (such as
the individual's divorce, adoption out of the family, or assignment of
his or her beneficial interest to another) and, conversely, individuals
who were not among the initial group of measuring lives must be
allowed to join that group later, if certain events happen (such as
marriage, adoption into the family, or receipt of another's beneficial
interest by assignment or succession) and if they were living when the
interest in question was created. The proxy method eliminates the
problems of identifying and tracing a rotating group of measuring lives
so intrinsic to the actual-measuring-lives approach. The expiration of a
waiting period measured by a flat period of 90 years is easy to
determine and unmistakable.
The Drafting Committee considered possible grounds for resisting
the replacement of the actual-measuring-lives approach, despite the
gain in administrative simplicity that would result from adopting a flat
period of years. One such ground was the idea that the use of actual
measuring lives--especially if determined by the causal-relationship
method-generates a waiting period that self-adjusts to each situation,
somehow extending the dead hand no further than necessary in each
case. A flat period of years obviously cannot replicate a self-adjusting
function. The concern proved to be unfounded, however: a little
inspection revealed that this is not the function performed by the
actual-measuring-lives approach. Although that approach produces a
waiting period whose length differs from one case to another, the use
of actual measuring lives does not generate a waiting period that
expires at a natural or logical stopping point along the continuum of
each disposition, thereby pinpointing the time before which actual
vesting ought to be allowed and beyond which it ought not to be
permitted. Instead, the actual-measuring-lives approach-whether the
measuring lives are determined by statutory list or causal-relationship
formula-functions in a rather different way: it generates a period of
time that almost always exceeds the time of actual vesting in cases in
which actual vesting ought to be permitted. The actual-measuringlives approach, therefore, performs a margin-of-safety function, which
is a function that can be replicated by the use of a proxy such as the flat
90-year period under the Uniform Act.
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The following examples briefly demonstrate the margin-of-safety
function of the actual-measuring-lives approach:
Example (1)-Corpus to grandchildrencontingent on reachingan
age in excess of 21. G died, bequeathing property in trust, income
in equal shares to G's children for the life of the survivor, then in
equal shares to G's grandchildren, remainder in corpus to G's
grandchildren who reach age 30; if none reaches 30, to a specified
charity.
Example (2)-Corpusto descendants contingent on surviving last
living grandchild. G died, bequeathing property in trust, income
in equal shares to G's children for the life of the survivor, then in
equal shares to G's grandchildren for the life of the survivor, and
on the death of G's last living grandchild, corpus to G's
descendants then living, per stirpes;if none, to a specified charity.
In both examples, assume that G's family is typical, with two
children, four grandchildren, eight great-grandchildren, and so on.
Assume further that one or more of the grandchildren are living at G's
death, but that one or more are conceived and born thereafter. All of
the grandchildren living at G's death were then under the age of 30.
As is typical of cases that violate the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities and to which wait-and-see applies, these dispositions
contain two revealing features: (i) they include beneficiaries born after
the trusts were created, and (ii) in the normal course of events, the
final vesting of the interests will coincide with the death of the youngest
of these after-born beneficiaries (as in Example (2)) or with some
event occurring during the lifetime of that youngest after-born
beneficiary (such as reaching a certain age in excess of 21, as in
Example (1)).
By tradition, the waiting period is measured by the lives of
individuals who must be in being at the creationof the interests. In both
of the above examples, on the facts given, the youngest measuring
life-the one likely to live the longest and therefore determine the
length of the waiting period-is G's youngest grandchild in being at G's
death. That grandchild, it should be noted, is undoubtedly the
youngest measuring life under either the statutory-list or the causalrelationship method. The key players in these dispositions, however,
are the after-born grandchildren, for the youngest of them is likely to
live longer than the youngest measuring life. Because the after-born
grandchildren are not counted among the measuring lives, the
expiration of a waiting period measured in the traditional fashion
cannot be thought to coincide with the latest point when actual vesting
should be allowed-in the above cases, on the death of the last survivor
of G's grandchildren, the youngest of whom is after-born. It is the
tack-on 21-year part of the waiting period that almost always extends
the period sufficiently so that it expires at some arbitrary time after that
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beneficiary's death and thereby validates the dispositions. In Example
(2), the period of 21 years following the death of the last survivor of the
grandchildren who were in being at G's death is normally more than
sufficient to cover the death of the last survivor of the grandchildren
born after G's death.
Thus the actual-measuring-lives approach performs a margin-ofsafety function. A proxy for this period performs this function just as
well. In fact, in one respect it performs it more reliably because, unlike
the actual-measuring-lives approach, the flat 90-year period cannot be
cut short by irrelevant events. The supposition that the tack-on 21-year
part of the period is usually ample to cover the births, lives, and deaths
of the after-born beneficiaries (when it is appropriate to do so) relies
on the measuring lives living out their statistical life expectancies. They
are not guaranteed to live that long, however. Though unlikely, they
might all die prematurely, thus cutting the waiting periods shortpossibly too short, even, to cover these post-creation events. Plainly,
no rational connection exists between the premature deaths of the
measuring lives and the time properly allowable, in Example (1), for
the youngest after-born grandchild to reach 30 or, in Example (2), for
the death of that youngest after-born grandchild to occur. A flat period
eliminates the possibility of a waiting period cut short by irrelevant
events.
Another question raised by a 90-year waiting period is whether it
authorises excessive dead-hand control. Any concern that it does must
be put in a proper perspective: First, the Uniform Act does not
authorise an increase in aggregate dead-hand control beyond that
which is already possible under the full rigour of the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities by the common practice of utilising perpetuity
saving clauses. In fact, it now seems to be agreed that the waiting period
under wait-and-see operates much like a perpetuity saving clause.
Dispositions such as those in Examples (1) and (2) are routinely
created and are validated by such clauses. No demonstrated harm
seems to have befallen society as a result-even though the period of
time generated by a perpetuity saving clause can easily exceed 90
years, as can the period of time generated by a waiting period
measured by actual measuring lives plus 21 years, whether the
causal-relationship or statutory-list method is used. Second, the fact
that the waiting period under the wait-and-see element of the Uniform
Act is 90 years does not mean that vesting in all trusts or other property
arrangements will be postponed for the full 90 years, or even come
close to being postponed for that long. As with a perpetuity saving
clause, final vesting in most trusts or other property arrangements will
occur far earlier, so that the perpetuity-period component of the clause
or its near equivalent, the 90-year waiting period under the Uniform
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Act, extends unused into the future long after the interests have vested
and the trust or other arrangement has been distributed. If excessive
dead-hand control is a problem, then, it is not the Uniform Act that is
or would be the root cause, but the common-law Rule itself, especially
the feature of the common-law Rule that allows the use of perpetuity
saving clauses to validate otherwise invalid interests such as those in
Examples (1) and (2), above.
For all of the above reasons, which are elaborated in greater detail in
an article on the Uniform Act published in 21 Real Property,Probate&
Trust Journal569 (1987), the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Act
came to believe that a flat 90-year waiting period is to be preferred over
the other approaches: without authorising dead-hand control beyond
that which is routinely invoked by competent drafting, the 90-year
waiting period performs the same margin-of-safety function as the
actual-measuring-lives approach, performs it more reliably, and
performs it with a remarkable ease in administration, certainty in
result, and absence of complexity as compared with the uncertainty
and clumsiness of identifying and tracing actual measuring lives.
Adopting a flat period of 90 years rather than using actual
measuring lives is an evolutionary step in the refinement of the
wait-and-see doctrine. Far from revolutionary, it is well within the
tradition of that doctrine. The 90-year period makes wait-and-see
simple, fair, and workable. The unique approach of the Uniform Act
deserves serious consideration wherever perpetuity reform is
undertaken.
LAWRENCE W.

WAGGONER.*

* James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Reporter, Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.
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